By Gift Chapi-Odekina, Abuja
After decades of debate, failed attempts, and mounting insecurity that has left Nigerians questioning the capacity of a centralised police force to police a country of over 200 million people spread across 36 states, the National Assembly has placed before the executive a landmark constitutional alteration bill — Bill No. 7 — formally titled “A Bill for an Act to Alter the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to Provide for the Establishment of State Police and for Related Matters (Sixth Alteration) 2026”.
The bill is not merely an administrative reform. It is a seismic restructuring of Nigeria’s security architecture, touching the very foundations of how law and order will be maintained in a federation long criticised for over-centralising police power in Abuja.
What the bill seeks to do
The bill’s explanatory memorandum is blunt in its purpose: it seeks to alter the 1999 Constitution to provide for the establishment of state police. But the architecture it creates is more nuanced than a simple handover of policing to state governments. It establishes a dual policing structure, a federal police and state police operating side by side, regulated by a new national body and governed by a framework of minimum national standards.
CLAUSE 1 — Alteration of the constitution
What it says: This is the enactment clause. It formally designates the 1999 Constitution (as altered) as “the Principal Act” and signals that all subsequent clauses are amendments to it.
Implication: Straightforward but foundational. It anchors the entire bill in the constitutional alteration framework, meaning these changes, once passed, will carry the full weight of constitutional authority and cannot be undone by ordinary legislation.
Clauses 2 to 5 — Textual Alteration of Fundamental Rights Provisions
Sections altered: 34, 35, 39, and 42 of the Constitution.
What they say: These clauses make identical textual substitutions throughout the fundamental rights chapter, replacing the word “police” with the phrase “Nigeria Police Force” in four separate sections dealing with forced labour, personal liberty, freedom of expression, and freedom from discrimination.
Implication: This is a technical but necessary housekeeping exercise. As the constitution previously used the generic term “police” in several places, the amendment clarifies that references in these rights provisions apply to the Nigeria Police Force specifically, a term that will now encompass the Federal Police, ensuring that constitutional protections against arbitrary arrest, forced labour, and discrimination apply uniformly regardless of whether a citizen encounters Federal or State Police.
Critics, however, may argue that this framing implicitly privileges federal definitions even in areas where states will eventually exercise independent policing authority.
Clause 6: Alteration of section 84 (Remuneration of certain officers)
What it says: Section 84(4) lists officials whose remuneration is charged to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The clause updates the names of oversight bodies in this provision, replacing “the National Police Council and the Federal Police Service Commission” with “the Nigeria Police Council and the Police Service Commission”.
Implication:
Primarily a renaming and harmonisation exercise to align with the new institutional structure created by the bill. It ensures that members of the new police oversight bodies whose salaries are protected from political interference by being constitutionally charged are formally included in this financial protection framework.
Clauses 7 & 8 — Alteration of sections 89 and 129 (Legislative powers of evidence)
What they say: These clauses update the language governing who may serve summonses and warrants issued by the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly. Section 89 is amended to replace “Federal Police” with “Nigeria Police Force”, and Section 129 replaces “State Police” with “Nigeria Police Force”.
Implication:
These amendments harmonise the language of legislative enforcement powers with the new dual police structure. By anchoring both legislative chambers’ enforcement powers in the unified “Nigeria Police Force” terminology, the bill ensures that both the Federal Police and State Police units can lawfully execute legislative summons and warrants — preventing legal ambiguity about which force has authority to execute parliamentary orders.
Clause 9 — Alteration of section 153 (Federal Executive Bodies)
What it says:
Section 153(1) lists the federal executive bodies established by the Constitution. The clause makes two changes: (a) the “Nigeria Police Council” is renamed the “National Police Council”, and (b) the word “Federal” is inserted before “Police Service Commission”, renaming it the “Federal Police Service Commission”.
Implication:
The renaming of the Nigeria Police Council to the National Police Council is significant. It signals a shift from an exclusively federal body to one with national oversight responsibilities inclusive of state police, while the creation of a distinct “Federal Police Service Commission” foreshadows the parallel creation of state police service commissions (established in Clauses 10 and 17). This dual-commission architecture is the institutional backbone of the entire reform.
Clause 10 — Alteration of section 197 (State executive bodies)
What it says: A new paragraph (d) is inserted into Section 197(1), establishing State Police Service Commissions as constitutional bodies for each of the 36 states.
Implication: This is one of the most consequential structural provisions in the bill. Currently, state governors have no constitutionally recognised body to manage police appointments and discipline at the state level. The creation of state police service commissions gives each state a formal, constitutional mechanism to recruit, discipline, and manage its police force, insulating these functions from pure gubernatorial fiat.
Whether these commissions will be genuinely independent or become political instruments of incumbent governors remains the central question analysts are asking.
Clause 11 — Alteration of Chapter VI, PART III (Subheading)
What it says: The subheading “B Nigeria Police Force” in the Constitution is replaced with the new subheading “B Federal and State Police”.
Implication:
Symbolic but important. The constitutional chapter that once recognised only one police force now formally recognises two distinct institutions. This signals a fundamental departure from Nigeria’s post-independence tradition of centralised policing — a tradition critics trace back to colonial administrative design.
Clause 12 — Alteration of section 214 (the core provision)
What it says: The entire Section 214, which previously established the Nigeria Police Force as the only lawful police force in Nigeria, is replaced with a new section titled “Establishment of Federal and State Police”. The new section:
Establishes both a federal police and a state police as constitutional bodies;
Requires the National Assembly to legislate the structure and powers of the Federal Police and set the framework and minimum standards for state police;
Prohibits any state police from commencing operational policing until it has been established by a law of the state house of assembly and certified as meeting national minimum standards.
Provides that the Federal Police shall continue to police any state where State Police have not commenced operations and shall continue performing federal policing functions even after State Police commence;
Grants the Federal Police power to intervene in a state’s internal security only in three circumstances: a complete breakdown of law and order where the state police are overwhelmed; upon request by the governor; or where the state police are inoperative due to administrative or financial problems and only after approval by the National Police Council.
Designates the Federal Capital Territory as permanently within the Federal Police’s jurisdiction.
Implication:
This is the heart of the bill and the most debated provision. Proponents argue it solves Nigeria’s security crisis by empowering state governments, who arguably understand local security dynamics better than Abuja, to maintain their own forces. The certification requirement is designed to prevent ill-equipped or politicised state forces from going operational prematurely.
However, critics raise serious concerns. The provision allowing federal police intervention “where there is a complete breakdown of law and order” is broad and potentially subject to abuse; it could become a pretext for federal interference in political opponents’ states.
The requirement that intervention be approved by the National Police Council provides a safeguard, but only if that council is genuinely independent. The ban on federal police “routine” interference with state police is also open to interpretation in a country with a history of deploying security forces against political opponents.
Clause 13—Alteration of Section 215 (Appointment and Command)
What it says: A new Section 215 governs the leadership of both forces:
The Federal Police shall be headed by an inspector-general of police, appointed by the President on the advice of the National Police Council, subject to confirmation by the National Assembly.
The State Police shall be headed by a commissioner of police, appointed by the governor on the advice of the National Police Council, subject to confirmation by the State House of Assembly.
Governors may give the commissioner of police lawful directions on maintaining public safety.
Where the commissioner believes a gubernatorial direction is unlawful or contradicts policing standards, he may refer the matter to the National Police Council, whose decision shall be final.
Implication:
The dual appointment pathway attempts to balance executive authority with institutional independence. The requirement that both the Inspector-General and state commissioners be appointed on the “advice of the National Police Council” rather than at the sole discretion of the president or governor is a critical safeguard. The provision allowing a Commissioner to refer unlawful gubernatorial directives to the National Police Council is arguably the most innovative clause in the bill. It creates a formal escape valve for police officers pressured to act politically, in theory preventing a repeat of situations where state security forces are allegedly deployed against opposition figures or ethnic communities. In practice, however, its effectiveness will depend entirely on the National Police Council’s independence and willingness to rule against sitting governors.
Clause 14 — Alteration of section 216 (Removal of police heads)
What it says: A new framework for the removal of both the inspector-general and state commissioners:
The Inspector-General can only be removed by the President upon recommendation of the National Police Council and only for grave misconduct, breach of the Police Act, fraud conviction, bankruptcy, or mental incapacity subject to approval by two-thirds of the National Assembly.
A state commissioner can only be removed by the governor on the recommendation of the National Police Council for similar grounds subject to two-thirds of the State House of Assembly.
A new Section 216A directs the federal government to provide grants and aid to state police on recommendation of the National Police Council, subject to National Assembly approval.
Implication:
The two-thirds legislative approval requirement for removing both police heads is an exceptionally strong security of tenure provision. It is designed to insulate police leadership from political retaliation, a recognised problem in Nigeria, where police heads have historically been removed for resisting political interference. The federal grants provision is equally significant: it acknowledges that many states may lack the fiscal capacity to fund an independent police force and creates a constitutional mechanism for federal support, though it simultaneously introduces a potential lever for federal pressure on state police through funding conditionality.
Clause 15 — Alteration of the second schedule (legislative list)
What it says:
The Exclusive Legislative List is amended in three ways:
Item 2 (Arms and Ammunition): The exclusivity of federal control over arms is modified — states are now permitted to acquire light arms for the purpose of policing.
Item 28 (Fingerprints and Criminal Records): Updated to allow State Police to collect, retain, use, and share biometric and criminal records, subject to federal law;
Item 45 (Police): Renamed “Federal Police and other government security services established by law for the Federation”, removing the blanket federal monopoly on policing;
A new paragraph 20B is inserted into the Concurrent List, authorising the National Assembly to set minimum policing standards nationally, while allowing State Houses of Assembly to legislate their own forces subject to the condition that no state may set standards lower than national minimums, though states may exceed them.
Implication:
Allowing states to acquire light arms for policing is a radical but necessary provision. State police without weapons would be meaningless. The concurrent list placement of policing standards is a clever constitutional architecture: it preserves federal regulatory supremacy on minimums while granting states genuine legislative autonomy. The explicit prohibition on federal authority over routine command, deployment, and personnel decisions of state police is a direct response to fears of indirect federal control, but its enforcement will require vigilant courts and robust oversight institutions.
Clauses 16 & 17 — Alteration of the third schedule (Institutional Design)
What they say: These clauses restructure the National Police Council and create State Police Service Commissions.
National Police Council (replacing Nigeria Police Council) membership now includes the following:
A chairman appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly;
The Attorney-General of the Federation;
A serving assistant inspector-general representing the Federal Police;
Attorney Generals of all 36 states.
Six retired commissioners of police (one per geopolitical zone);
Representatives of the National Human Rights Commission, Public Complaints Commission, Nigerian Labour Congress, Nigerian Bar Association, Nigerian Union of Journalists, and six traditional rulers (one per zone).
Its functions now include appointing federal police officers below inspector-general; recommending the appointment and removal of state commissioners and deputy/assistant commissioners; supervising both federal and state police; prescribing national training, forensic, and criminal intelligence standards; and rendering assistance to state police.
State Police Service Commissions (one per state) shall include the following:
A governor-appointed chairman confirmed by the State House of Assembly;
Human Rights Commission representatives;
Public Complaints Commission representative;
Nigerian Labour Congress representative;
Three retired assistant commissioners of police (one per senatorial district);
Nigerian Bar Association and Journalists’ Union representatives;
Chairman of the State Traditional Rulers’ Council.
Their functions include recommending the appointment of senior state officers to the National Police Council, managing the appointment and discipline of officers below Assistant Commissioner rank, and recommending three candidates for Commissioner of Police to the National Police Council.
Implication
The expanded National Police Council is among the most ambitious institutional designs in recent Nigerian constitutional history. By including civil society, the legal profession, journalists, labour, and traditional rulers alongside government officials, the bill attempts to embed accountability mechanisms directly into the apex police oversight body. Whether this inclusive design produces genuine independence or creates a large, unwieldy bureaucracy susceptible to capture remains to be seen.
The State Police Service Commission structure mirrors this, with local civil society integration potentially creating a police oversight culture that is more locally accountable than anything Nigeria has previously attempted.
Clause 18 — Citation
What it says: The bill is to be cited as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Sixth Alteration) Bill, 2026.
What does this bill mean for Nigeria?
The State Police Bill represents the most significant restructuring of Nigeria’s security architecture since independence. It addresses a genuine constitutional failure: the inability of a single, centralised police force headquartered in Abuja to effectively police a vast, diverse, and geographically complex federation.
But the bill is not without risks. Four critical fault lines emerge from a careful reading:
Gubernatorial Capture: Despite protections, the appointment of state commissioners on gubernatorial advice, even with National Police Council oversight, risks creating police forces that serve incumbent governors rather than citizens. States with weak opposition and low institutional culture are particularly vulnerable.
Federal Overreach: The intervention provisions, while narrowly drawn, contain language broad enough to permit federal interference in states governed by opposition parties if the National Police Council is politically compromised.
Fiscal Inequality: States with thin revenue bases may struggle to fund credible police forces, creating a two-tier policing system where wealthier states have effective forces and poorer ones remain dependent on and potentially subordinate to the federal police.
Transition Risks: The bill is silent on the timeline and mechanics of transitioning from the current Nigeria Police Force to the new dual structure. The certification requirement before a state police officer can commence operations is important, but the standard-setting process is left entirely to future legislation.
Ultimately, the State Police Bill is constitutionally sophisticated, institutionally ambitious, and politically necessary. Whether it transforms Nigeria’s security landscape or becomes another well-designed reform overtaken by implementation failure will depend on the quality of the legislation that follows, the independence of the institutions it creates, and, above all, the political will to let the system work as designed.
